Before the word “taper” ever left the lips of anyone occupying an official position at the Federal Reserve in the late spring of 2013, there was already something very much amiss. Not that you would have known it, of course. In the financial media, everything was moving along swimmingly, Bernanke the thrice-crowned hero. QE4 had been dutifully buried by its [...]
The issue of inflation targeting has once again come to the forefront, though for reasons and in a way policymakers had never anticipated. That speaks volumes already. The recent introduction of this (flexible) average inflation targeting is merely the latest tweak to a process that’s already more than thirty years old. Not exactly new thinking. While the US Federal Reserve [...]
For the first time, it was encouraging to see and hear quite a lot of people talking about the September calendar quirk. That’s progress; a small but noticeable segment of the financial public setting aside the mythical dogma of bank reserves and asking the right questions. However, I fear that having been “disappointed” by this year’s version of it, how [...]
Little noticed at the time, October 2012 was quite the roller coaster. Most anyone cared about was QE3, the wonderful, awesome flood of liquidity kindly wise-man Chairman Bernanke had restarted for reasons that didn’t seem so important. Did it matter to the public that the repo market went haywire late in that very same month, at the very same time [...]
It’s another one of those myths that gets repeated over and over because it has never been realistically challenged. Not in any public way. The Fed says its dollar swap lines, central bank liquidity swaps as they call them today, worked beautifully. They may not use that particular word to describe the results, but you are distinctly left with that [...]
On March 15, 2013, the US Treasury Department issued a request for a “large position report” (17 CFR Part 420). Any institution holding $2 billion or more of the 2% notes expiring in February 2023 (10-year maturity) had until March 21 to disclose that fact to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (faxed disclosures accepted). The repo rate for [...]
It’s a behavioral shift, one we’ve seen before. Misunderstood because of idiocy like QE, even those who’ve undergone the change fail to appreciate the deeper meaning behind it. Not just at the firm-level, more so systemically. GFC1 had left everyone, even the best of businesses, essentially stranded fighting for their lives. Lost revenue was secondary to daily survival.Liquidity.Among the grandest [...]
Around the same time Lehman Brothers and AIG became headline news in the middle of September 2008, none of the mainstream econometric models thought it was possible for the US economy to suffer so severe a shock that it would induce monetary policymakers to unleash ZIRP. Worse, the models all predicted that it would be impossible for anything to force [...]
So, you’re convinced that low rates are powerful stimulus. You believe, like any good standing Economist, that reduced interest costs can only lead to more credit across-the-board. That with more credit will emerge more economic activity and, better, activity of the inflationary variety. A recovery, in other words. Ceteris paribus. What happens, however, if you also believe you’ve been responsible [...]
It’s now more than two months out from GFC2 and more importantly the Fed’s response to it. Why is Jay Powell’s reaction more important? Simple. Because it outlines what happens next. Had the FOMC been anywhere close to successful in anything other than convincing the media, GFC2 might’ve been a singular instance of disruption related to the non-economic shock of [...]
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