More than ten years after Alan Greenspan confessed to not understanding bonds and interest rates, the same assumptions that underpinned Greenspan’s “conundrum” remain as convention. If the Fed raises the federal funds rate by target or by corridor, then all rates should rise. It is believed to be just that simple, a fact (the belief) further established this week by [...]
According to Alan Greenspan in a speech delivered at Stanford University in September 1997, monetary policy in the United States had been shed of M1 by late 1982. The Fed has never been explicit about exactly when, or even why, monetary policy changed dramatically in the 1980’s to a regime of pure interest rate targeting of the federal funds rate. [...]
The FOMC voted today to raise the federal funds corridor by another 25 bps. It was the third such change and the second over the past three months. Judging by the reactions to it, you would think this is 2004 again. It is not. It is instead perfectly consistent where on a day when the media describes a “strengthening” economy [...]
The Consumer Price Index increased 2.74% in February 2017 over February 2016. That was the highest inflation rate registered in this format since February 2012. As has been the case for the past three months, the acceleration of headline inflation is due almost exclusively to the sharp increase in oil prices as compared to the lowest levels last year (base [...]
We are at the stage ten years later where it is still necessary to define terms. In every finance and economics textbook, the chapter on monetary policy defines “tight” money as when the Federal Reserve (or whatever central bank) raises its policy rate(s). Conversely, “accommodative” money is where it lowers the rate(s). In the US system, the technical reason given [...]
In August 2014, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer admitted to an audience in Sweden the possibility in some unusually candid terms that maybe they (economists, not Sweden) didn’t know what they were doing. His speech was lost in the times, those being the middle of that year where the Fed having already started to taper QE3 and 4 were [...]
November 2008 was an extremely busy month for authorities in the US. The financial markets had just undergone panic the month before, but rather than dissipate there were lingering indications that all was not yet over. On November 23, 2008, the Treasury Department, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve issued a joint statement on Citigroup. The first two had agreed [...]
On February 23, the equivalent yield for the 4-week US Treasury bill was just 39 bps. That was almost 11 bps (counting full pips) below the so-called money rate floor, to which T-bills are a near enough equivalent to count in that view. It was also 36 bps below IOER, which at one time was thought to be a huge [...]
Rather than bury this chart in my earlier discussion of liquidity preferences, I felt it deserved its own piece to highlight what it shows. By all traditional and orthodox Economics, this just should not be possible. Yet, there it is and it’s not the only example of violation. For very different markets as robust as each one is, there should [...]
There was an extremely odd dynamic for monetary policy during the 1990’s and especially in the United States. The less Alan Greenspan said, the more markets were convinced he knew what he was doing. He purposefully said nothing, being attributed years later with developing this “fedspeak.” So long as he continued to say nothing, the more he would have to [...]
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