This goes back to the earliest days of the Federal Reserve. In 1912 and even before, in order to sell the skeptical public on another central bank – the nation’s third, and first in three-quarters of a century - in what was already going to be an uphill battle, Congress demanded that this thing be called something other than a [...]
Economists’ R*, or R-star, is a fiction. It’s one that they came up with after-the-fact to try to explain why their policies didn’t actually work the way policymakers had initially promised. While in public, officials still speak glowingly of each QE, one after another after another, in private they know it deserves absolutely no praise. Study after study has shown [...]
Eurodollar futures are derivative, cash-settled contracts linked to 3-month LIBOR (forget about SOFR and the official hatred of this offshore dollar rate regime). Though that rate acts independently especially at the worst times (thus, the hate), it is heavily influenced by the front-end monetary alternatives set by the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy (IOER, RRP). Because of this, LIBOR kind of [...]
In theory, it goes like this: QE or any sort of large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) undertaken by a central bank is needed during times of trouble in order to reduce interest rates in general. Buying bonds seems like it would lower yields, and lower yields mean more accommodative credit, therefore a boost to the real economy.So simple, straightforward, and intuitive, [...]
Quick questions: who said the following, and when did this person say this? Our own country has tried one economic theory after another. The present Administration asked for, and received, extraordinary powers upon the assurance that these were to be temporary. Most of its proposals did not follow familiar paths to recovery. We knew they were being undertaken hastily and [...]
The Federal Reserve has allowed itself an image of a marshmallow when it comes to the banking system it is (one-third) charged with regulating. First and foremost, along with the two other (redundant) triplets, the OCC and FDIC, the US central bank is not a central bank at all; it is near exclusively a domestic bank regulator. And while “macroprudential” [...]
All the signs were there, starting with the fact that the Fed and ECB together had supposedly the flooded the world with digital money yet a palpable “something” was really off. Ben Bernanke’s central bank had unleashed both ZIRP and QE, the latter of which had finished up a couple months before. In Europe, Jean Claude-Trichet’s outfit was “highly accommodative” [...]
Fear of the ultra-inflationary aspects of fiscal overdrive. This is the current message, but according to what basis? Bigger is better, therefore if the last one didn’t work then the much larger next one absolutely will. So long as you forget there was a last one and when that prior version had been announced it was also given the same [...]
The Aussies weren’t the first to drive into the YCC channel. That “honor” belonged instead where it always does: Japan. The Japanese had also pioneered yield curve control just like they had for practically every single element behind post-crisis monetary policy everywhere else around the world. It’s always a safe bet that if some central bank somewhere starts doing something [...]
You’d think Larry Summers would know better. Not that he stepped in it, again, but rather why he did this particular time. Making a big deal out of inflationary aggregate demand when he’s been practically the lone mainstream Economist to look at the post-2008 economy in an honest and serious fashion to then somehow failing to incorporate that view into [...]
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