Perhaps the hardest part of analyzing the eurodollar system is synchronizing all its various dimensions into a common perspective. Coming from the traditional standpoint that views all these various parts as if they are all separate, such a task is often quite difficult. For example, the repo market is almost always described from the cash perspective as if there only [...]
For quite some time now I have been writing (constantly) about “something” going in “dollar” markets and funding markets all over the world. Chinese markets related to “dollars” have been the most prominent in their disorder, but there is a degree of causation that runs from eurodollars to China and perhaps back again. In other words, Chinese illiquidity is not [...]
The UST GC repo rate was at or near 50 bps for the ninth consecutive trading day today, fixing at 50.5 bps. In what has become routine of late, DTCC reported on-exchange volume in UST was a paltry $37.3 billion, leaving the 20-day average of volume at just $51.4 billion – the lowest in a long time. Volume in MBS [...]
Repo fails in the past two weeks (the week of August 17 the most current figures) were both more than $192 billion. Though that level is highly elevated, those were actually the fewest fails since mid-June, and the fewest in consecutive weeks since early May. The 8-week average remains about $245 billion, a noticeable increase from even last year’s “dollar” [...]
Going back to Japan for a third time today (it is more than deserved), at least in the setup, the Financial Times on August 1 astutely picked up what the rest of the mainstream media missed about the last BoJ policy moves. They correctly judged the “dollar” intentions, but also that it wasn’t nearly enough, as I wrote earlier. However, nobody [...]
It’s not an exact fit or correlation, but that’s not the point. One follows the other, though the manner in which they relate is outside of any view. The point here is common sense, unclouded by the increasing absurdity with which this simple relationship is denied: Repo fails are an indication of collateral “tightness.” Dealer net long inventory is an [...]
Last July, the US Treasury Department finally issued its official report detailing its account of what happened on October 15, 2014. The statement was co-authored by staff at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FRBNY, the SEC, and CFTC, as if the government were going overboard trying to prove its word the end of the matter. As [...]
As an apparent consequence of post-Brexit uncertainty, the effective federal funds (EFF) rate moved up from 38 bps in “yield” to 40 bps, and then even 41 bps on June 27. That rather tame reaction is due to the fact that there is nobody aside from primarily GSE leftovers trading in federal funds. That the market rate moved even 3 [...]
It might be expected that monetary policy would fail to achieve its goal in attempting to manage the economy when it cannot even meet its own basic technical requirements. The main lever of Fed policy continues to be the federal funds rate even though it is entirely irrelevant, and has been for a long time. There is much more to [...]
With stocks down for a second day, attention has been focused on the UK vote potentially in favor of leaving the EU. It seems like a naturally disruptive event, or at least in theory, an outcome that the mainstream globalist persuasion continues to emphasize. That is certainly one possible explanation, but a more likely scenario is one where CNY plays [...]
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