The textbook says that whenever the central bank raises its policy rate that means tightening. Actual experience over more than just this last lost decade demonstrates that at the very least it is much more complicated than that. There is far more evidence of monetary policy being nothing more than a response, as that reverse condition can absolutely be established [...]
November 2008 was an extremely busy month for authorities in the US. The financial markets had just undergone panic the month before, but rather than dissipate there were lingering indications that all was not yet over. On November 23, 2008, the Treasury Department, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve issued a joint statement on Citigroup. The first two had agreed [...]
On February 23, the equivalent yield for the 4-week US Treasury bill was just 39 bps. That was almost 11 bps (counting full pips) below the so-called money rate floor, to which T-bills are a near enough equivalent to count in that view. It was also 36 bps below IOER, which at one time was thought to be a huge [...]
The most basic link in finance is that between risk and reward. Just like alchemists who once sought a path to gold from lead, a great deal of modern finance was built around finding a shortcut between them. Discovering the great asymmetry where risks would be low but rewards sky high was the Holy Grail of later 20th century mathematics. [...]
The release of the 2011 FOMC transcripts has provided some useful clarity on the thinking of Federal Reserve officials. Unlike in 2008, policymakers were a little better acquainted with wholesale money and its possible points of failure. They never did solve or even identify all of them, of course, but the repo market in particular seems to have finally been [...]
With 2a7 money market reform only a few weeks from its full implementation, there should be by now visible shifts in all the places where such reform will directly impact. Prominent among these money spaces is commercial paper, where the ranks of prime MMF’s that once lent in this market have been reduced in the shift toward government funds. As [...]
The fact that we are still discussing illiquidity in “dollar” markets everywhere shows just how little has changed despite so much time and effort. It is August 9 again, the ninth anniversary of the day that changed everything. Even though it has been almost a decade, it’s as if “we” learned nothing from the experience. There are indications in 2016 [...]
As an apparent consequence of post-Brexit uncertainty, the effective federal funds (EFF) rate moved up from 38 bps in “yield” to 40 bps, and then even 41 bps on June 27. That rather tame reaction is due to the fact that there is nobody aside from primarily GSE leftovers trading in federal funds. That the market rate moved even 3 [...]
The Fed’s control over money markets has always been tenuous, a myth more than anything, it just wasn’t so obvious at one time. That observation extends to its grasp of even basic operations, a spectacular fail revealed by its 2000’s treatment of the Discount Window. On January 9, 2003, the FOMC altered decades of monetary history by switching the Discount [...]
You couldn’t really call it a calming effect, as rates never truly settled down rather simply becoming less obviously meddlesome. At the September FOMC, the “dovish” sentiment that was apparently received brought LIBOR rates off their devastatingly devilish perch that had been building from all the way back in early July. As if it needed to be restated, that surge [...]
Stay In Touch